Victor Davis Hanson on how wars are really won:
A central theme in most of the memoirs of high-ranking officers of the Third Reich is the attrition of their best warriors. In other words, among all the multifarious reasons why Nazi Germany was defeated, perhaps the key was that hundreds of thousands of its best aviators, U-boaters, panzers, infantrymen, and officers, who swept to victory throughout 1939â€“41, simply perished in the fighting and were no longer around to stop the allies from doing pretty much what they wanted by 1944â€“45.
After Stalingrad and Kursk, there were not enough good German soldiers to stop the Red Army. Even the introduction of jets could not save Hitler in 1945 â€” given that British and American airmen had killed thousands of Luftwaffe pilots between 1939 and 1943.
After the near destruction of the Grand Army in Russia in 1812, even Napoleonâ€™s genius could not restore his European empire. Serial and massive Communist offensives between November 1950 and April 1951 in Korea cost Red China hundreds of thousands of its crack infantry â€” and ensured that, for all its aggressive talk, it would never retake Seoul in 1952â€“53.
But arenâ€™t these cherry-picked examples from conventional wars of the past that have no relevance to the present age of limited conflict, terrorism, and insurgency where ideology reigns?
Not really. We donâ€™t quite know all the factors that contributed to the amazing success of the American â€œsurgeâ€ in Iraq in 2007â€“08. Surely a number of considerations played a part: Iraqi anger at the brutish nature of al-Qaeda terrorists in their midst; increased oil prices that brought massive new revenues into the country; General Petraeusâ€™s inspired counterinsurgency tactics that helped win over Iraqis to our side by providing them with jobs and security; much-improved American equipment; and the addition of 30,000 more American troops.
But what is unspoken is also the sheer cumulative number of al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists that the U.S. military killed or wounded between 2003 and 2008 in firefights from Fallujah to Basra. There has never been reported an approximate figure of such enemy dead â€” perhaps wisely, in the post-Vietnam age of repugnance at â€œbody countsâ€ and the need to create a positive media image.
I think this is an excellent essay that sees the forest. One of the great mystery clouds of the Iraq War, and the Afghanistan War, is just what they have cost the jihadist movement globally. I’ve written here and elsewhere that I believe that George Bush’s cynical side understood that these war theaters were killing fields, and that the building of democratic systems was featured because it was the hopeful side of the coin. The killing of the enemy was underplayed, perhaps because it was so successful.